Markets reshape daily life in North Korea but an uprising remains unlikely

by Riko Seibo
Tokyo, Japan (SPX) Jan 03, 2026

North Korea's informal markets have become central to daily survival and are quietly changing how people relate to the state, yet analysts say the country still lacks the conditions needed for a popular uprising against the Kim regime.

A new study argues that the roots of these changes lie in the 1990s "Arduous March" famine, when the breakdown of the Public Distribution System forced citizens to trade food and basic goods outside official channels. As state rations collapsed, farmers and traders expanded local markets that now function as a parallel economy across most of the country.

Over time, satellite imagery and field research have documented hundreds of market sites nationwide, from provincial capitals to smaller towns. These markets provide food, clothing and household items, but they also give citizens a measure of autonomy and limited social space outside direct state control.

Economists and North Korea specialists say this marketization has weakened the regime's monopoly over livelihoods by allowing people to earn and store money beyond state wages and rations. Surveys of defectors and in-country sources indicate rising frustration with policies that interfere with trading activity, underscoring how deeply markets are embedded in ordinary life.

The paper highlights the 2009 currency redenomination as the clearest flashpoint in this new environment. When authorities abruptly revalued the won and temporarily shut markets, they destroyed the savings of small traders and disrupted key supply chains, triggering rare displays of anger including confrontations with officials and reports of people burning unusable banknotes.

Pyongyang quickly rolled back parts of the policy and blamed senior economic official Pak Nam Gi, who was later purged, signaling that the leadership had miscalculated the political risk of attacking market-based wealth. Analysts view this reversal as evidence that the state must now take popular economic grievances into account, even if it retains broad coercive power.

The study also describes gradual erosion in some of the regime's traditional control tools, such as the Inminban neighborhood watch system. As more households earn cash from trading, they are better able to bribe local officials to overlook unauthorized moves, small-scale smuggling or other rule-breaking, undermining the effectiveness of grassroots surveillance.

Sanctions and the collapse of the command economy have pushed state agencies and parts of the elite into market-linked activities as well, with officials expected to self-finance operations and still deliver loyalty payments to the center. This dependence on semi-private income could create tensions between central authorities and local power brokers whose livelihoods rely on trade networks.

Despite these cracks, the paper concludes that the core security and military elites remain loyal to Kim Jong Un and that opposition remains fragmented and leaderless. There is no widely accepted alternative ideology, and no organized movement has emerged to coordinate grievances across different regions and social groups. To assess the prospects for a "North Korean spring," the author applies political sociologist Jack Goldstone's model of revolution, which stresses the need for economic strain, mass anger, elite alienation, a unifying ideology and favorable external conditions. North Korea clearly faces economic hardship and widespread discontent, but the study finds little sign of elite defection or the kind of organized leadership that has preceded revolutions elsewhere.

For now, the analysis suggests that North Korea is more likely to see localized protests and policy reversals, such as those following the 2009 currency reform, than a sudden collapse of the regime. Markets have changed how people live and given them new tools to navigate and sometimes blunt state control, but they have not yet produced a cohesive challenge to the Kim family's rule.